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Abstract
The toss of a coin is usually regarded as the epitome of randomness,
and has been used for ages as a means to resolve disputes in a simple, fair
way. Perhaps as ancient as consulting objects such as coins and dice is
the art of maliciously biasing them in order to unbalance their outcomes.
However, it is possible to employ a biased device to produce equiproba-
ble results in a number of ways, the most famous of which is the method
suggested by von Neumann back in 1951. This paper addresses how to ex-
tract uniformly distributed bits of information from a nonuniform source.
We study some probabilities related to biased dice and coins, culminat-
ing in an interesting variation of von Neumann’s mechanism that can be
employed in a more restricted setting where the actual results of the coin
tosses are not known to the contestants.
1 Introduction.
Estimating probabilities is one of those tasks at which the human brain seems
to be not very good. Conditional probabilities, in particular, are frequently
defying—and defeating—one’s intuition, from the uninitiated to the specialist.
This explains to a certain extent why people lose money gambling and on similar
activities. Led astray by instinct, the inadvertent player overlooks probabilistic
subtleties and misestimates the odds.
In this paper, we study some probabilities which may be rather counter-
intuitive. Although our results were formulated in the context of games be-
tween two opponents, they could as well have been framed in terms of the
general engineering problem of converting biased randomness into unbiased
randomness, a fascinating subject with plenty of literature available (see, for
instance, [3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14]).
In Section 2, we describe a game where the winning chances depend on the
fairness of a die with n ≥ 2 sides in a nontrivial way. Indeed, even knowing
beforehand the exact probability associated to each side of the die, it may not
be so easy to decide, between two seemingly equivalent strategies, which one is
the most advantageous. Still, it is possible to show that one strategy is never
worse than the other, no matter the bias or the number of sides of the die. We
then look at some special cases. Particularly for n = 2, we derive the winning
chances as a function of the bias, showing how to maximize the probability that
a given player wins.
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In Section 3, we consider the following questions regarding three independent
and identically distributed (iid) random variables A,B, and C. Are the events
C = B and B 6= A always independent? When, and to which extent, may (the
knowledge of) the former affect (the probability of) the latter? The answers to
these questions are closely related to the results in Section 2.
Finally, in Section 4, we leverage the results from the previous sections into
a variation of von Neumann’s method of playing a fair heads or tails with a
biased coin. Numerous improvements on von Neumann’s original idea have
been studied over the decades ([1, 7, 9, 12], to mention but a few). Our method
handles, however, an extra restriction: the players are not able to know the
actual result of each coin toss, instead they are only aware of whether each toss
produced the same result as the previous one along a sequence of independent
tosses.
2 A triple or two straight doubles?
In this section, we discuss a very simple dice game, not only for its own sake,
but also for the useful inequality we obtain from it.
Consider a die with n ≥ 2 sides. We propose a game where each player
must choose between two strategies: playing for a “triple” or two “consecutive
doubles”. In the former strategy, the player throws the die three times, scoring
a point if the die produces three identical results. In the latter, the player
throws the die four times, scoring a point if the results after the first and the
second throws match one another and the third and fourth results also match
one another. After repeating their sequences of throws a previously arranged
number of times, the player with more points wins the game.
One might think that both strategies are equally good (or equally terrible,
depending on how big n is). Indeed, when playing for a triple, there are two
critical moments at which the player needs to be lucky: at the second throw,
whose result is required to match the first one; and at the third throw, which
is also required to match the other two. When playing for two doubles in a
row, there are also two such critical moments: at the second throw, when the
player wants the die to match the result that just preceded it, and again at the
fourth throw, for the same reason. In spite of their apparent equivalence, the
odds for both strategies are not always as good, and how more advantageous
one strategy is depends on the fairness of the die.
In order to get some intuition, suppose our die is strongly biased towards one
particular outcome (say it results in a 1 in 90% of the throws). What difference
does it make, now, to play for a triple or two straight doubles? When playing
for a triple, one has only three chances of “going wrong”, that is, of throwing
the die and obtaining something other than 1. (Of course it is possible that
such other-than-1 outcome appears three times in a row, but that is definitely
unlikely.) On the other hand, when playing for two straight doubles, one has
in practice four chances of “going wrong”, since any other-than-1 outcome that
ends up occurring will most likely remain unmatched. Now we proceed to a
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more formal discussion.
Claim 1. If A,B,C, and D are iid discrete random variables, then Pr{A =
B ∧ C = D} ≤ Pr{A = B = C}.
Proof. Let Ω be the range of possible values of A,B,C, and D. For i ∈ Ω,
let pi be the probability Pr{A = i} = Pr{B = i} = Pr{C = i} = Pr{D = i}
that a given variable takes value i. Let E2,2 denote the event that A = B and
C = D, and let E3 denote the event that A = B = C. Since the variables are
independent, we can write
Pr{E2,2} =
(∑
i∈Ω
p2i
)2
, (1)
and
Pr{E3} =
∑
i∈Ω
p3i . (2)
We now show that Pr{E2,2} ≤ Pr{E3}. Inspired by its use in [6], we recall the
Cauchy inequality [2, p. 373](∑
i∈Ω
xiyi
)2
≤
(∑
i∈Ω
x2i
)(∑
i∈Ω
y2i
)
.
Setting xi = p
3/2
i and yi = p
1/2
i , we obtain(∑
i∈Ω
p2i
)2
≤
(∑
i∈Ω
p3i
)(∑
i∈Ω
pi
)
=
∑
i∈Ω
p3i
as desired.
As a consequence, the probability of obtaining a triple in three throws of a
die is never less than the probability of obtaining two straight doubles in four
throws of that die. It should now be clear that equality must not be taken for
granted. We look at some special cases.
From now on, let A,B,C, andD be specifically the results of four consecutive
throws of an n-sided die; that is, iid random variables defined by selections on
the sample space Ω = {1, . . . , n}. We denote by pi the probability that i is the
result obtained by throwing that die, for i ∈ Ω.
Perfectly fair dice. Consider the case where pi = 1/n for all i ∈ Ω; that is,
our die is “perfectly fair”. In this situation, equations (1) and (2) yield
Pr{E3} = Pr{E2,2} = 1
n2
,
and therefore both players have the same probability of winning the game. As a
matter of fact, it is a simple exercise to show that Claim 1 holds with equality if,
and only if, either the random variables are uniformly distributed over a subset
of their sample space or one of the possible outcomes occur with probability 1.
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Perfectly loaded dice. Suppose the die was manufactured in such a way
that the same side always ends upwards after a throw, e.g. p1 = 1, and pi = 0
for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Of course both strategies will score a point at each and every
sequence of throws, and the game will almost certainly end in a draw. As in
the perfectly fair case, there is no preferable strategy.
Coins. We now focus on the case n = 2 and call our die a coin. We are
interested in the function d : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that quantifies the advantage d(p) =
Pr{E3}−Pr{E2,2} of playing for a triple when the probability of our coin landing
heads is p. By making p1 = p and p2 = 1− p in (1) and (2), we obtain
d(p) =
[
p3 + (1− p)3]− [p2 + (1− p)2]2
= −4p4 + 8p3 − 5p2 + p.
It is now easy to see (Figure 1) that d has minimum value 0 at p ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
as expected, and maximum value 0.0625 at p = 1/2± 1/(2√2) ≈ 0.5± 0.3536.
In other words, 6.25% is the largest possible probabilistic advantage that can
be obtained in this game1. This is achieved by the player who plays for a
triple when the probability of the coin landing heads (or tails, by symmetry) is
approximately 85.36%.
Figure 1: Advantage of playing for a triple as a function of p
3 Seemingly irrelevant knowledge.
Let us look at a different experiment. Someone throws a die with n ≥ 2 sides
three times in a row, and writes down the sequence of results, calling them A,B,
and C. You want to guess whether C = B. Does it make any difference if you
are told that B 6= A?
1 Should a winning margin of 6.25% appear to be rather small, compare it with the casino’s
winning margin of 5.26% in the American roulette, and of only 2.70% in the European roulette.
Yet, we do not see casinos going bankrupt quite too often!
4
Because the throws of the die are mutually independent, it is tempting to say
that the fact that the first two results (A and B) do not match has no correlation
whatsoever to whether the third result (C) matches the second one. However,
this reasoning turns out to be deceiving. The variables are independent, but
are the events they define necessarily so? What if the die is not perfectly fair?
Here again we start with an intuitive discussion. Suppose the die is so biased
that one of its sides (say, 1) lands upwards in 90% of the throws. In this case,
the event B 6= A reveals that something unexpected happened, that is, A and
B are not both 1. Since it is highly probable that C is 1, we cannot anymore
say that our assessment of the probability associated to the event C 6= B was
unaffected by the knowledge that B 6= A.
More formally, let Ω be the range of possible values of three iid random
variables A,B, and C. For i ∈ Ω, let pi be the probability Pr{A = i} = Pr{B =
i} = Pr{C = i} that a given variable takes value i.
Clearly,
Pr{C = B} =
∑
i∈Ω
p2i (3)
and
Pr{C = B | B 6= A} = Pr{C = B 6= A}
Pr{B 6= A} =
∑
i∈Ω[p
2
i (1− pi)]∑
i∈Ω[pi(1− pi)]
. (4)
The following result relates the two probabilities above.
Claim 2 (Fonseca et al. [6], Lemma 6). Given three iid discrete random vari-
ables A,B, and C, we have Pr{C = B | B 6= A} ≤ Pr{C = B}.
For an example where equality does not hold, let Ω = {1, 2, 3}, p1 = 0.8,
p2 = p3 = 0.1. In this case, Pr{C = B} = 0.66, whereas Pr{C = B | B 6= A} ≈
0.429.
In the realm of dice, the probability that the third result matches the second
one given that the second result does not match the first one in a sequence of
three independent throws of a die is less than or equal to the unconditional
probability that the third result matches the second one.
Perfectly fair dice. By replacing pi with 1/n in equations (3) and (4), it
is straightforward to verify that both probabilities are equal to 1/n. In other
words, if the die is fair, then the probability of having a match between the
third and the second results is not at all affected by the fact that the second
throw and the first one do not match. The events are in this case independent.
Perfectly loaded dice. If the die always lands with the same side upwards,
then it is impossible that two throws have different outcomes. Our comparison
here is then meaningless.
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Coins. When n = 2, the unconditional probability that two tosses of the coin
yield the same result is clearly
Pr{C = B} = p21 + p22 = p2 + (1− p)2 = 2p2 − 2p+ 1, (5)
where p denotes, without loss of generality, the probability of heads. Such a
probability has minimum value 0.5 at p = 0.5 (i.e. for a fair coin).
On the other hand, the conditional probability we are interested in is ob-
tained from equation (4) and translates to
Pr{C = B | B 6= A} = p
2(1− p) + (1− p)2p
2p− 2p2
=
p− p2
2p− 2p2
= 0.5,
regardless of p (of course, provided p is not 0 or 1).
A simpler way of seeing this is noting that, given that the first two coins
came up differently, the second coin is uniformly distributed over heads and
tails. Thus the probability that the third coin results the same as the second is
0.5p+ 0.5(1− p) = 0.5.
This interesting result, which motivates the whole next section, is summa-
rized in the corollary below. We recall that a Bernoulli random variable is such
that it takes value 1 with “success probability” p and value 0 with “failure
probability” 1− p.
Corollary 3. Given three independent Bernoulli random variables A,B, and
C with success probability 0 < p < 1, we have Pr{C = B | B 6= A} = 0.5
regardless of p.
4 Hand claps and whistles.
The idea of playing a fair heads or tails with a biased coin2 is attributed to von
Neumann [8]. The coin is tossed twice in a row. The first player wins if the
outcome is a heads-tails sequence, whereas the second player wins with a tails-
heads sequence. If two identical results are obtained, another turn of two coin
tosses starts from scratch. The probability of winning the game at a certain turn
is identical for both players, namely p(1 − p), where p is the probability that a
coin toss results heads. Thus, the probability that some player wins at a certain
turn is q = 2p(1− p), and the number of turns until the game has a winner is a
geometric random variableX whose expectation is E{X} = 1/q = 1/(2(p−p2)).
Since each turn comprises exactly two coin tosses, the expected number of tosses
until a player wins using von Neumann’s method is 2E{X} = 1/(p− p2).
2 In spite of the numerous references to such entity over the centuries, some recent evidence
seems to show that there is no such thing as a biased coin that is caught by the hand (i.e. the
coin is allowed to spin in the air, but not to bounce). See [5] for finding out why the biased
coin may be considered the unicorn of probability theory.
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Now suppose we have a situation where the coin is concealed, that is, the
contestants are not able to see the outcome of each toss. Instead, they can only
figure out, after each toss, whether the result happened to match the one that
just preceded it, which we refer to as the base result. For the sake of illustration,
consider that the coin is tossed by a trusted third party who claps hands each
time the coin toss results the same as in the previous toss, and who whistles
otherwise. Only after the very first toss (the initial toss, in each game), no
sound is produced, since there is no base result to compare with. We want to
assure fairness, and we certainly cannot use von Neumann’s original method,
since the actual coin results are not known to the players.
We first discuss wrong ways of trying to obtain a fair game.
4.1 Unsuccessful attempts at fairness.
In the proposed setting, the players cannot see the actual results, but they
hear something after each toss3: a hand clap (Cl) or a whistle (Wh). Then
why not simply regard a hand clap as heads, a whistle as tails, and play the
good old heads or tails? In other words, after the initial toss, have the coin
be tossed exactly once more. Player 1 wins with a hand clap, Player 2 wins
with a whistle. Of course one can play such a game, but one should not expect
it to be fair if the coin itself is not fair. Indeed, the greater the coin bias, the
greater the advantage of playing for a hand clap. Formally, if p is the probability
that the coin lands heads, then the probability that Player 1 wins is equal to
the probability that two independent tosses of the coin yield the same result,
namely p2 + (1 − p)2 = 2p2 − 2p+ 1, whose minimum value 0.5 is obtained at
p = 0.5, as in (5).
Aiming at neutralizing the coin bias, a second, natural attempt is to use
a straightforward translation of von Neumann’s idea based on the perceived
sounds. After the initial toss, which sets the first base value, the coin is tossed
twice in a row. Player 1 wins with a Cl-Wh sequence, Player 2 wins with a
Wh-Cl sequence. If any other sequence occurs, the game proceeds with another
turn of two coin tosses. Is the game now fair, regardless of the coin bias? We
show that it is not, except again if p = 0.5.
To calculate the probability P1 that Player 1 wins the game, let F
H and FT
denote the events where the initial toss results heads (H) or tails (T), respec-
tively, so that
P1 = Pr{P1 | FH} · Pr{FH}+ Pr{P1 | FT } · Pr{FT }
by the law of total probability. By letting PH1 = Pr{P1 | FH} and PT1 =
Pr{P1 | FT }, we can write
P1 = P
H
1 · p+ PT1 · (1 − p). (6)
We now obtain PH1 conditioned on the results of the two coin tosses that
followed the initial toss (whose result was heads, by definition):
3Except for the initial toss, as mentioned above.
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• [base H] H-H — this sequence yields two hand claps, no player wins yet,
and the probability that Player 1 eventually wins is still PH1 due to the
memorylessness of the process, which now starts over with a new turn of
two tosses still having heads as base value;
• [base H] H-T — this gives a Cl-Wh sequence, and victory is awarded to
Player 1;
• [base H] T-H — we have two whistles and no winner, hence the probability
of Player 1 winning is still PH1 , as in the case H-H;
• [base H] T-T — a whistle followed by a hand clap: victory goes straight
to Player 2.
Using again the law of total probability, we can write
PH1 =
∑
S∈S
Pr{PH1 | S} · Pr{S}
= PH1 · p2 + 1 · p(1− p) + PH1 · (1 − p)p+ 0 · (1 − p)2,
where S = {H-H, H-T, T-H, T-T} is the set of events associated to the two
coin tosses that follow the initial toss, as mentioned above. After some easy
manipulations, we obtain
PH1 = p. (7)
An analogous argument shows that
PT1 = 1− p. (8)
By plugging (7) and (8) into (6), we obtain P1 = p
2+(1−p)2 = 2p2−2p+1.
This is again the same expression as in (5), which has minimum value 0.5 at
p = 0.5. In short, the game is only fair when the coin itself is fair.
Before proceeding, it is interesting to notice that here—unlike the coin game
proposed in Section 2, where a probability of heads around 0.5± 0.3536 would
maximize a player’s winning odds—the greater the coin bias, the greater the
probability that Cl-Wh wins over Wh-Cl, in spite of the apparent symmetry of
both strategies. One could try this game against an inadvertent opponent (per-
haps someone who erroneously regard it as being equivalent to von Neumann’s
method). However, using a similar reasoning as in the calculation of P1, we see
that the expected number of tosses before the game finishes (disregarding the
initial toss) is 1/(p − p2), as in von Neumann’s method. This fact cannot be
overlooked. For example, when the coin is so biased that p = 0.999, though the
Cl-Wh player has a winning probability of 98.02%, the coin needs to be tossed
1001 times on average before the game has a winner!
In the next section, we look into a variation that successfully shields the
players from whatever bias the concealed coin might have (provided both sides
appear with non-zero probability).
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4.2 Fair game with a concealed biased coin.
We want to devise a coin game with the following properties:
1) the coin is possibly biased, yet the exact bias is unknown to the players;
2) both players have equal chances of winning;
3) the actual coin results are not revealed, but it is possible to infer whether
any two consecutive coin tosses yielded the same result.
The two first conditions are the usual ones. Ideally, we would like to cope
with the third, new condition without incurring any increase in the expected
duration of the game.
First, let us consider the natural solution of tossing the coin four times,
considering the sounds X and Y produced after the second and fourth tosses,
respectively. Player 1 wins with a Cl-Wh sequence, Player 2 wins with Wh-Cl,
and the other possible sequences are discarded, triggering four fresh tosses of
the coin. By doing so, X and Y are clearly independent, and this approach
corresponds exactly to von Neumann’s idea, therefore assuring a fair game.
The drawback is that it may take twice as long, with an expected number of
1/(−2p4 + 4p3 − 3p2 + p) coin tosses, which can be easily checked.
Now consider the following variation. The main action consists of tossing
the coin two consecutive times, whose results we call respectively A and B,
constituting a turn. If a whistle is heard after the second toss (meaning B 6= A),
then a third coin toss—whose result we call C—will decide the game. Player 1
wins if C 6= B (indicated by the subsequent whistle), Player 2 wins if C = B
(indicated by the subsequent hand clap). On the other hand, if the sound alert
after the second coin toss is a hand clap (meaning B = A), then the game
continues with a fresh turn of two coin tosses that will set the values of A and B
from scratch, configuring a perfectly memoryless process. Note that an initial
toss that would set a base value prior to the first turn is not even necessary
here, since the players only care about sound alerts that come with even parity
(after the second, fourth, sixth etc. tosses) until a whistle with even parity is
heard for the first time. When it eventually happens, a single, decisive extra
toss closes the game.
Theorem 4. The proposed coin game, where Player 1 wins with a whistle of
even parity immediately followed by another whistle, and Player 2 wins with a
whistle of even parity immediately followed by a hand clap, is a perfectly fair
game, no matter the probability of heads 0 < p < 1 of the employed coin.
Proof. Let A and B be the results of the two coin tosses that preceded the
first whistle with even parity. That very whistle indicates B 6= A. The next
coin toss, whose result we call C, will decide the game in Player 1’s favor if
C 6= B, and in Player 2’s favor if C = B. Using a simple (tails→ 0, heads→ 1)
mapping, those three results are clearly independent Bernoulli random variables
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with success probability p. Thus, by Corollary 3, both players have identical
probabilities
Pr{C 6= B | B 6= A} = Pr{C = B | B 6= A} = 0.5
of winning the game.
As for the expected number of tosses, notice that the event that a whistle
is heard after the second toss of a turn corresponds to the event that the two
consecutive tosses of that turn produces either a H-T or a T-H sequence, hence it
occurs with probability 2p(1−p). The number of turns before the game finishes
is therefore a geometric random variable X , whose expectation is E{X} =
1/(2p(1 − p)), plus one (corresponding to the final, decisive toss). Thus, the
expected number of tosses in the game is
2 · E{X}+ 1 = 1
p− p2 + 1, (9)
which is only one coin toss greater than in the original von Neumann’s method.
It is interesting to observe that, if in an attempt to reduce its expected
duration we decided the game right after the first whistle regardless of its parity,
then two unfortunate consequences would ensue:
(i) the intended “improvement” would not decrease the expected length of
the game at all; and, most importantly,
(ii) we would not be able to assure the fairness of the game anymore!
To show (i), let FH (and, respectively, FT ) denote the event that the first
coin toss in the game yields heads (respectively, tails), and let Y be the random
variable corresponding to the number of tosses before the first whistle is heard.
Using conditional expectations, we can write the overall expected number of
tosses in the modified game as
1 + E{Y } = 1 + E{Y | FH} · Pr{FH}+ E{Y | FT } · Pr{FT }
= 1 +
(
1 +
1
1− p
)
· p+
(
1 +
1
p
)
· (1− p)
= 1 +
1
p− p2 ,
which is exactly the same as in (9).
To show (ii), we argue that Player 1—who wins the game if the sound after
the first whistle is another whistle—will win the game exactly if:
• the first coin toss yields H, and the toss immediately after the first
occurrence of a T (which produces the first whistle of the game) yields H
(producing the second whistle in a row); or, analogously,
• the first coin toss yields T, and the toss immediately after the first occur-
rence of a H yields T.
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Thus, the probability that Player 1 wins the game is p2+(1−p)2 = 2p2−2p+1,
the same function of p seen in (5)—which has minimum value 0.5 exactly at
p = 0.5—yet again.
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